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Austerlitz and Hermann Broch’s The Sleepwalkers 
 
Even the most extreme consciousness of doom threatens to degenerate into idle 
chatter. (Adorno, Prisms 34 ; Prismen 26)
 
With a precision suggesting a sleepwalker his clumsiness invariably guided him 
to the very centre of a misfortune... (Arendt 13) 
 
Uncertain Steps 
When we first encounter the narrator of Austerlitz, he is wandering round the unfamiliar 
town of Antwerp with, he tells us, ‗unsicheren Schritten‘ (1; 9). As well as reflecting the 
unfamiliarity of the locale, these ‗uncertain steps‘ evince a proud modesty characteristic 
of the classic Sebaldian narrator, a wanderer who discreetly relays the stories of the 
people and places he is privileged to encounter. In this instance, the willingness to get 
lost pays off almost instantly, leading to his first meetinng with Austerlitz in the railway-
station waiting room, or ‗salle des pas perdus‘. Uncertain or lost steps, it seems, are the 
way to go. Later, when Austerlitz finds himself counting in Czech, a language he was 
previously unaware he could speak, he too feels as if he is walking with ‗unsicheren 
Schritten‘ (226; 234). But the uncertainty here belongs only to Austerlitz‘s waking 
consciousness, as he witnesses with astonishment the spontaneous reemergence of a 
capacity he had forgotten he ever had. Although Sebald does not use the phrase, steps of 
this sort, unpurposed yet unerring, are made with what is commonly known in German 
as somnambule Sicherheit: the legendary surefootedness of the sleepwalker.  
The convergence in a single phrase of sleepwalking and certainty poses an 
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interesting challenge to one of the central tenets of the English-language canonisation of 
Sebald. For where his writing has been most highly valued, it is in terms of its ability to 
move the reader through apparent certainties towards a salutary uncertainty. But 
somnambule Sicherheit presents the possibility that the current may be reversed, that 
narrative may move under cover of uncertainty towards certainty. That Sebald criticism 
has not been more troubled by this possibility is in no small part due to the fact that it, 
like Sebald‘s fictions themselves, tends to deploy the notion of sleepwalking with a 
minimum of reflection on its theoretical ramifications. To evoke some of the 
complexities of this matter, I will presently have to offer a brief history of some 
important issues in the cultural history of sleepwalking, as well as a brief account of the 
topic of uncertainty in Sebald criticism. The main part of my argument, however, will be 
given over to an extended comparative analysis of sleepwalking in Sebald‘s Austerlitz 
and Hermann Broch‘s 1933 novel-trilogy The Sleepwalkers. These writers have not 
previously been the object of any sustained comparison, and this is perhaps partly due to 
Sebald‘s extraordinarily hostile critique of Broch in his essay ‗Una montagna bruna—
Zum Bergroman Hermann Brochs‘, published just as he was starting to produce his own 
fiction. But Broch‘s sleepwalking can, as I will show, illuminate much that is left 
implicit on the topic in Sebald‘s fiction, and will also bring to light some difficult 
questions regarding the role of aesthetics and agency in Sebald‘s work. 
 
Somnambulisms 
Noting the presence of sleepwalking, and related notions of trance or hypnotism, in 
Sebald‘s narratives, is not in itself new. Indeed, ‗hypnotic‘ and ‗mesmeric‘ are amongst 
the most common epithets used to describe his prose. But such remarks are invariably 
casual, fleeting, and unreflecting, as if the ideas at stake belonged to a common stock of 
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familiar motifs of no particular provenance, and with no particular debts to settle. So, for 
Simon Ward, it is ‗not surprising‘ that Michael Hamburger‘s vision of the ruins of 
postwar Berlin in The Rings of Saturn is ‗hallucinatory‘, because it is experienced in ‗a 
kind of sleepwalk‘ (Ward 62). Such a casual linkage of sleepwalking and extraordinary 
vision, however, belies a long and complex history. Of course, with the vogue for 
mesmerism in literary studies, it is now well-known that sleepwalking‘s association with 
clairvoyance dates to 1784 when the Comte de Puységur coins the term 
‗somnambulisme provoqué‘ (Ellenberger 70-72). But the vision of sleepwalkers had 
been a matter of debate long before this, and the sleepwalker‘s surefootedness is key to 
this history. From the early modern period, the question was: if the senses are shut, what 
keeps the sleepwalker safe? Thus, for Jacobus Horstius, it is surefootedness that exceeds 
nature and points to the hand of providential angels (Horstius 15-17). Such popish 
superstition was countered by more materialist accounts—usually a mélange of 
Aristotle, Lucretius, and Galen—but even in these, the performance of the ‗imagination‘ 
set free by the extinction of the senses retains something of the marvellous (Pomarius 
10-14, Sauvages 307, Muratori 51). Mesmerism inherits these debates, and never quite 
has done with them. And when mesmerism recedes from the cultural horizon, 
somnambule Sicherheit remains the aspect of sleepwalking that keeps one foot in the 
fantastic.  
In an age of disenchantment and disappointed rationalism, however, this sense of 
the fantastic or providential proves highly equivocal. When Freud uses the phrase 
somnambule Sicherheit (or one of its common variants, schlafwandlerische or 
traumwandlerische Sicherheit) on a number of occasions in The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, it describes the only-seemingly miraculous manner in which the 
unconscious leads us back to rediscover an object we hid in a blind rage (see e.g. SE 
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140; GW 155-56). But the phrase thus also holds open a door to a mystical reinvestment 
which, raised onto a political stage cleared of obstacles, may prove disastrous. Thus 
when Hitler, speaking in Munich in 1936, declares he moves ‗mit traumwandlerischer 
Sicherheit‘, we are to understand that his steps are directed and consecrated by the 
destiny of the Volk (Domarus 790; 606). In a curious way, Hitler here represents himself 
as the mass man of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century social theory, only 
magnified and put at the head of the mass. The analogy may seem stretched: mass man, 
one would tend to think, is a figure of incapacity, not of surefootedness. In Gustave Le 
Bon‘s crowd theory, sleepwalking models the unconsciousness and moral incapacity of 
the individual caught in a crowd. And according to José Ortega y Gasset‘s techno-
criticism, technology supplements mass man‘s capabilities in such a way as to supplant 
his rationality and agency entirely. Yet in either case, the sleepwalker is still surefooted 
after a fashion—that of the machine, the mass, or routine. Hitler has not added 
surefootedness to this picture, but he has reinstated the sense of providence that makes 
him a just instrument. This crucial detail apart, he never spoke a truer word. 
It is important to note all this because the role of ideas of somnambulism in 
German art and culture of the period of the rise of National Socialism has tended to be 
swallowed up in the more familiar theme of hypnotism. Hypnotism‘s important and 
ambiguous role in German cinema of the 1920s and 1930s, notably in the films of the 
Fritz Lang, was pointed out long ago by Siegfried Kracauer. Its use as a fable for 
demagoguery is also familiar from novels such as Thomas Mann‘s Mario and the 
Magician (1930). But ideas of unprovoked sleepwalking and trance also have a part to 
play: the protagonists of Mann‘s The Magic Mountain (1924) and Elias Canetti‘s Auto 
da Fé (1935) are drawn into alternative worlds, disastrously blind to unfolding political 
events, and struggle to establish any meaningful agency. The most sustained and 
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nuanced exploration of these themes in all their social and political implications is to be 
found in Hermann Broch‘s 1933 novel-trilogy The Sleepwalkers. All Broch‘s characters 
are more or less sleepwalkers, in the sense that their idea of the path they tread is 
pathetically incapable and misguided. But they are at their worst when most surefooted. 
For this dubious capacity is owed to total complicity with a reified and false world. They 
may fall prey to, or even become, demagogues, but the efficient cause is their certainty. 
It matters considerably, then, how Sebald positions certainty in relation to 
sleepwalking in Austerlitz. Austerlitz‘s attempts to recall his past—his Czech infancy 
and evacuation on the Kindertransport in the 1930s—are gradual and halting until, in the 
midst of a breakdown, he buries his papers—the fruits of a failed, obfuscatory mode of 
research—and takes to aimless night wandering round London (178; 186). Thus it is 
semi-conscious, seemingly-undirected physical activity, rather than study and reflection, 
that leads him to a waiting-room in Liverpool Street station where, with the intensity of 
a vision, he is suddenly sure the Kindertransport disembarked (193; 201). Similarly, 
when he arrives in Prague, his senses rather than his intellect carry him unerringly to his 
parents‘ old apartment (212; 220). Throughout the novel, Austerlitz makes his advances 
in this way, by retracing past steps on the ground, and giving his consciousness up to the 
path, engaging involuntary memory at a level beyond the defensive formations of 
consciousness.  
As this last formulation hints, Sebald has often been read through variants of 
Freudian theory, in terms of trauma and anamnesis. The narrator‘s ‗unsicheren 
Schritten‘, however, are far less easily accommodated into this sort of theory. 
Austerlitz‘s forgotten history is his own to rediscover, but the narrator has no part in 
this, and the uncanny coincidences which repeatedly bring the two together must be of 
another order. Moreover, Sebald scarcely plays down the element of the uncanny in 
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these encounters. They occur in what seems to the narrator an incomprehensible 
(unbegreifliche) manner (36; 44). And one encounter happens ‗strangely enough‘ 
(sonderbarerweise) just as Austerlitz is musing on his need for a listener (59-60; 67-68). 
Doubtless a shared love of dingy train stations and other spots putatively imbued with 
the melancholy of disaster may go some way toward rationalising such coincidences, but 
what are we to do with the heightened rhetoric of destiny that accompanies them? 
Austerlitz‘s theory of the traces of pain which striate history (16; 24) seems germane to 
this question. For while we are lost in admiration for the beauty and pathos of his 
exposition of this dolorous idea, might not a doubt intrude as to the potential for 
mystification in the idea of an affective mark which exceeds the limits of the individual 
psyche to take on a quasi-objective existence as a pathway along which sensitive 
travellers may be unconsciously drawn? Our doubts will only increase if we suspect 
Sebald‘s writing itself aspires to this condition of perfect tact emerging out of apparent 
uncertainty. It is not impossible to read this claim in the narrator‘s admiration for 
Austerlitz‘s sentences. Developing out of absentmindedness (Zerstreutheit), yet highly 
balanced (ausgewogensten), Sebald‘s famous, rolling sentences might also be said to 
advance step-by-step (schritteweise) towards ‗a kind of historical metaphysic, bringing 
remembered events back to life‘ (14; 24). Indeed, given that a large part of the novel 
consists of Austerlitz‘s proxy narration, how could it not share in his putative capacities?  
 
Critical Certainties 
If there is any justice in the doubt I am raising here, it poses awkward questions for a 
highly influential tendency in Sebald criticism. Sebald is often seen as exemplary in his 
capacity to force readers into ethical vigilance by generating insoluble uncertainties. In 
this way the lulling, seductive quality of his prose, the seeming certainty of generic 
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categories, and the claims to truth of memoir and photography, are read as so many lures 
leading us to an inevitable and salutary frustration. So, discussing the ambiguous nature 
of Vera‘s somnambulistic vision in Austerlitz, Carolin Duttlinger notes that the 
photograph which prompts it positively engages ‗imaginary, hallucinatory response‘ 
(Duttlinger 163). The artifice is, however, foregrounded so as to reveal ‗the aporetical 
nature of the process of remembrance‘ (161). According to this line of argument, then, if 
Sebald‘s texts see clear, they nonetheless do not claim, in the mystical sense of 
clairvoyance or Hellsehen, to see through. Rather, what they show is precisely the 
opacity of phenomena, and the essentially fictive, mediated nature of historical recovery. 
If we as readers are led to sleepwalk, then, it is only to be jolted out of the illusion. 
Necessary and persuasive as this sort of argument is, one may still worry that it is 
sometimes a little too certain that Sebald does indeed generate this sort of uncertainty, 
and, paradoxically, that this leaves us in a good place (see e.g. Gregory-Guider). Other 
critics have taken issue with this. Peter Morgan, for instance, argues that Sebald‘s 
cultivation of generic uncertainty is more evasive than epistemologically demanding, 
and sees in his melancholia a universalising of disaster which postively invites over-easy 
and all-too-gratifying identifications. Julia Hell, responding to another essay by Todd 
Samuel Presner published in the same number of the journal Criticism, is rather less 
emphatically condemnatory, but in her discussion of Sebald‘s famous description of the 
Hamburg firestorm she questions the idea that it constitutes a ‗successful attempt to 
represent a modernist event‘ (Hell 370). The requisite ‗estranging modernist traces‘ are 
visible, but only barely so (371). Hell‘s article also, however, asks us to think about 
another sort of uncertainty, one that most Sebald criticism seems reluctant to pursue. 
For, she argues, the horror-stricken (entzetzensstarre) gaze which Sebald grafts onto the 
wide-open eyes (aufgerissenen Augen) of Walter Benjamin‘s ‗angel of history‘ conveys 
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his own predicament. Like the angel, Sebald is ‗mesmerized by death and destruction 
and seduced by a natural history of destruction‘ (375). The horror of his gaze is thus 
directed not just at ‗Germany‘s calamitous history‘ (376), but ‗at his own writing that 
comes so close, so dangerously close, to what it tries to keep at bay‘ (380).   
Hell‘s point here is not simply to condemn Sebald for aestheticising disaster, but 
rather to acknowledge what she calls the ‗unpredictable hazards of representation‘. This 
consideration takes us beyond any idea of uncertainty as the trustworthy outcome of a 
textual game led by our admired hero-author. For it suggests that literary material, in its 
exteriority, is not infinitely plastic. Self-evident as this last statement may seem, it is 
worth remembering at this point. Sebald has been the doubtful beneficiary of a critical 
reception, especially in the English-speaking world, that sometimes seems to want to see 
in him the bearer of an exorbitant writerly tact, an exceptional ability to pick his way 
through toxic elements of his cultural inheritance. Yet this very surefootedness is itself 
part of that cultural inheritance and, pushed too far, may itself prove toxic. Sleepwalking 
is thus not just any example of an equivocal topic in which Sebald becomes embroiled. 
It has the potential to render ambiguous the readerly and textual consciousness upon 
which criticism bases its moral judgements of praise and condemnation alike, and may 
even counsel an ambivalence which will not allow us simply to divide the honours 
neatly between authors. I will return to this matter in my concluding comments. For the 
time being, suffice it to say that the benevolence with which Sebald‘s fictions are often 
viewed stands in stark contrast to the (characteristically) polemical treatment he metes 
out to Broch. 
 
Sebald on Broch 
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Sebald‘s essay, ‗Una montagna bruna—Zum Bergroman Hermann Brochs‘, is trenchant 
and unforgiving to say the least.
i
 It is, nonetheless, not hard to sympathise with the case 
it makes regarding Broch‘s ‗mountain novel‘, Die Verzauberung (The Spell). The basic 
premise of the novel—a mysterious incomer gains mesmeric control over an Alpine 
village, leading the villagers to participate in human sacrifice—may suggest a parable of 
the dangers of demagoguery in the vein of Mann‘s Mario und der Zauberer. Troublingly, 
however, the sacrifice is apparently successful in restoring the serenity of nature. If the 
tale is thus evidently compromised by völkisch sentiment, Sebald nevertheless insists 
that the problem lies more in the manner of the telling (‗Una montagna‘ 121). His aim, 
characteristic of his criticism, is to show how an ‗aesthetic deficit marks an ethical one‘ 
(124), and in particular, how the novel‘s ‗inflationary aesthetic‘—its tendency to fill out 
a lack of meaning with tautology and portentous abstraction—can be seen as a symptom 
of political disavowal (125). The ‗inner emigrant‘, anxious to portray his dubious flight 
into the consolations of nature as ‗passive resistance‘, strays only further and further into 
notions of Heimat and transcendence; i.e. the heartland of Nazi ideology. Once the fatal 
first step has been taken, an empty style inflates itself exponentially with windy 
abstraction, as the self-deceiving writer can only bail out bad faith with yet more bad 
faith. 
Thus far, one cannot but agree: The Spell is a dreadful novel. Sebald is taking 
aim squarely at the mainstream of Broch criticism as represented by Paul Michael 
Lützeler. Lützeler and his followers have, since Sebald‘s rise to fame as a fictional 
author, cited his article, but only to reiterate their original position unmodified in any 
way (see e.g. Lützeler, Die Entropie 56, and Gottwald 159). And in this they seem to 
confirm the sense of complacent political apologetics that so enrages Sebald. Yet as 
Thomas Edelmann has pointed out, Sebald and Lützeler, despite their differences, share 
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an exaggerated expectation of consistency in the author‘s canon (Edelmann 9). Indeed, 
Sebald‘s essay uses The Spell as a key to what he sees as the failings of Broch‘s entire 
œuvre, and for all the justice of his comments on that novel, it is hard to see how this 
generalising move can be justified. For one thing, as Sebald freely concedes, his critique 
is indebted to the  theory of value produced by Broch himself ‗in better times‘ (123). Yet 
it is unclear when these times are supposed to have been. For the essays on 
‗Disintegration of Value‘ in the final volume of The Sleepwalkers, from which the 
critical ideas in question derive, are otherwise held by Sebald to be symptomatic of that 
novel‘s malaise: indeed, they represent the culmination of a disastrous theoretical 
tendency present from the start. In Sebald‘s account of his reading, initial admiration for 
the ‗cool objectivity‘ of the first volume (Pasenow) quickly gives way to mounting 
frustration as Broch ‗tries to bring his work to a synthesis‘, and the ‗analytical‘ narrative 
is increasingly held up by ‗extravagant theoretical constructions‘ (118). Thus the 
‗priority Broch gives to system over empirical detail‘, which blossoms into full-blown 
essays in the third volume (Huguenau), is prefigured in the transcendental narrative 
perspective of Pasenow. In this way, The Sleepwalkers is seen to outline the trajectory 
followed by the whole œuvre: the implicit desire to ‗tackle everything from an 
independent position once and for all‘ goes hand in hand with a ‗growing loss of reality‘, 
and terminates in the ‗hollowed-out resonance‘ of Broch‘s later novels (119). Sebald‘s 
tracking of the seeds of ‗lyricising and pure mystification‘ back to what he sees as the 
pretentious and overweening rationalism of Broch‘s first novel, is remorseless (119). 
The intensely teleological character of this argument is itself, one might say, announced 
from the very start of Sebald‘s essay, in its epigraph—‗Am Anfang Prophet, am Ende 
Zauberer‘ (118). This still leaves open the possibility, in the beginning, that the prophet 
may have had something to be said for him, before degenerating into a conjuror. But by 
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the end (of the essay), any such hope has been liquidated, leaving the prophet a mere 
shell from which the conjuror would always inevitably have emerged. 
Strident and even repellent as the essays on value may sometimes seem, it is 
possible to disagree with this damning assessment. Crucially, it is by no means clear that 
they do claim quite the transcendent mastery over the narrative that Sebald infers; or, 
therefore, that they always own their propositions in quite the way Sebald implies. For 
one thing, there are fair circumstantial grounds for attributing the essays to a character 
within the narrative, the starving and chronically perplexed philosophy student Bertrand 
Müller. If, as Jean-Michel Rabaté has asked, the author of the essays seems ‗alienated 
and mystified, how can one give them more than symptomological value? How can one 
reach beyond the limitations of individual logics and private worlds to find some central 
point of view?‘ (Rabaté 135). As Rabaté goes on to suggest, these are questions the 
novel not only poses but performs. If the essays strive to provide a rational supplement 
to the irrationalism of the narrative, they also argue that rationality is itself fatally 
constrained by the logos of the age, and ontogenetically sedimented with irrationality 
(Rabaté 145). Having thus cut the ground from under its feet, it is hardly surprising, and 
not necessarily a failing, that the novel struggles to come to a synthesis. 
Likewise, if the ‗loss of reality‘ in The Sleepwalkers is an aesthetic failing, it 
ought also to be admitted that it is fairly explicitly thematised as a symptom of the 
‗sleepwalking‘ which afflicts the characters. At this point, Sebald‘s failure to engage 
with what is after all the headline concept of the novel becomes critical. Viewed in this 
light, indeed, Sebald‘s sole reference to the topic is full of suggestion: ‗Bewegten sich 
die Schlafwandler noch in einer weitgehend landschaftslosen Welt, so grenzt die 
Frequenz der Landschaftsbilder im Bergroman schon ans Inflationäre‘ (123). That is to 
say: if the sleepwalkers moved in a broadly landscapeless world, the frequency of 
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landscape description in the The Spell borders on the inflationary. This statement surely 
requires us to complicate somewhat Sebald‘s notion of ‗loss of reality‘. For what looks 
like an empirical deficit—a ‗landscapeless world‘—seems to be held less reprehensible 
than, and may even be preferred to, an over-abundance. The paradox is, however, like 
the empirical fullness of The Spell, only apparent. For as Sebald reminds us later in the 
essay, Broch saw inflation and tautology as the figures characteristic of a process of 
reification (125). The landscape of The Spell is thus made up of pseudo-objects, 
congealed globules of pure ideology posing as the objective world. A ‗landscapeless 
world‘ may then quite reasonably be preferred in the limited, negative sense that it is at 
least less bad. 
But could we go further to infer a more positive verdict on the ‗landschaftslosen 
Welt‘? Sebald‘s remark is framed by discussion of a letter written by Broch in 1935 as 
he sat down to write The Spell in Tyrolean seclusion. Gazing out of his window, Broch 
fears he will not be able to tear his eyes away from the beauty of the Tyrolean 
countryside, and back to the empty page on his desk. This note of regret, Sebald objects, 
gives the lie to the ‗affirmative gesture‘ with which the landscape is presented in the 
novel, thus revealing its ideological function. To be truthful, in the circumstances, Broch 
ought to have presented the landscape ‗unter dem Aspekt des Verlustes‘ (123). This idea 
of writing ‗under the aspect of loss‘ is, though it is not applied directly to The 
Sleepwalkers, enormously suggestive; more so, indeed, than the somewhat inaccurate 
‗landscapeless world‘. For Broch‘s sleepwalkers do see and move through landscapes: 
the point is that the ground upon which they set foot may no longer be quite what they 
think it is. Like sleepwalkers, they walk in a landscape of their dreams. Indeed, 
something very similar could be said of the solitary walkers of spectral, melancholic 
landscapes Sebald would come to write himself. How will we view Sebald‘s distaste for 
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Broch‘s theorising if that very theorising turns out to be implicit in his own works?  
 
Groundlessness and Reification 
From the start of the first volume of his novel, Broch suggests that a terrifying loss of 
firmness befalls the very substance of the ground when its anchoring ideology comes 
asunder. Joachim von Pasenow, as the younger son, is ejected against his will from the 
family estate, into the city and a military career for which he is temperamentally 
unsuited. This personal and circumstantial exile, however, only serves to obscure a more 
radical loss of the land. It is 1888 and, with the accession of Wilhelm II, we are invited 
to see the beginning of the end of the German Empire.
ii
 The feudal Junkers have now to 
compete with rising industrialism, and though the loss of their estates and political 
influence is a long way off, the values once surely embedded in the land are already 
starting to work their way loose. Joachim feels this perhaps more than most of his class 
yet has no political understanding of the situation, experiencing only an amorphous and 
insidious ‗Unsicherheit‘. Clinging to the chimera of the land‘s essential goodness, he 
must look for alien interference in the shape of his friend Bertrand, who is leaving the 
army to become an industrialist: ‗yes‘, Joachim reasons to himself, ‗if Bertrand had 
grown up on the land he would not be spreading insecurity‘ (Sleepwalkers 31-32; 36). 
At times Joachim may even depend on what he sees as Bertrand‘s ‗Sicherheit‘, his 
cosmopolitan sophistication, but this only makes him all the more uneasy (134; 150-51). 
Blaming alien causes is doomed to failure, for the trouble infects the very heart 
of the aristocratic landscape of house and estate. Although Joachim says he longs for the 
country while he is in the city, it is precisely in the city, and in the form of longing, that 
the value of the land is most present to him. Wandering an unsuitable suburb, he is free 
to dream of this Heimat as an idealised parkland through which his intended, Elisabeth 
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Baddensen, wafts virginally in the evening mist (26; 30). In her physical presence, on 
the other hand, Joachim is deeply disturbed by the thought that marriage will mean 
consummation, which seems to him an outrage against the ideal; he would prefer to steal 
Elisabeth away so as to keep her forever ‗unviolated [...] in a dream of white lace‘ (33-
34; 38-39). Joachim is already fairly deranged even at this early stage in the narrative, 
but the dream parkland itself is no mere freak of his psychology. Elisabeth‘s father will, 
she feels, only be free of anxiety when he has bought up the entire surface of the world 
and turned it into ‗a park in which [she] might walk about for ever‘ (71; 81). This 
tableau, then, represents the inmost desire of Joachim‘s belatedly chivalric class. The 
unabashed commercialism of Baron Baddensen‘s solution tacitly acknowledges that it is 
an anachronism. Joachim‘s problem, on the other hand, is that he believes too 
thoroughly in the purity of the ideal. This, indeed, is the ‗Romanticism‘ of the novel‘s 
sub-title: it is what happens when ‗the secular exalts itself as the absolute‘ (20; 23). But, 
as Broch explains in the final volume, this passionate yearning for ‗the familiar 
assurance of home [Heimat], for an invisible assurance in visible things‘ only leads to 
the invisible usurping the visible (540; 596-97). So reverie, powerless to effect the 
required wholesale transformation of reality, terminates in hallucination. And 
hallucination proves a precarious refuge: Joachim has tried to export the problem of sex 
by having an affair with a deracinated Bohemian peasant, but as his reverie of the 
virginal parkland grows nearer and sharper, it is Ruzena the peasant he sees in 
Elisabeth‘s place (26; 30). As the novel moves towards the inevitable, conventional 
marriage with Elisabeth, Joachim becomes psychotic in his inability to manage the 
economy of his phantasies, endlessly merging faces, and unsure of where he is or how 
he got there. 
 Having drifted from its apparently objective grounding, the ideal of the parkland 
15  
 
 
seems to undergo a curious sort of democratisation in the second volume. By 1903 Esch, 
a clerk whose vision of an orderly double-entry universe has been shattered, shares the 
vision of Heimat as a vulnerable damsel in the park, even though he has never had any 
connection to the land. Doubtless his vision has become a little more obviously kitsch, 
with its spangly dresses and nuzzling deer (277; 311). By the same token, he also has a 
glimmering apprehension that it is a representation. It appears as a stage backdrop 
(Prospekt) in the midst of a troubled series of visions, all seen in explicitly theatrical 
terms (Kulisse, Bühne), relating to his demented plan to murder Bertrand, now an 
influential shipping boss. When Bertrand‘s country house fails to match Esch‘s vision, it 
is the reality that must be cast aside as a ‗symbolic substitute‘ (sinnbildliche 
Stellvertretung), a dream within a dream. In this way, the dream landscape survives 
‗unscathed‘, but a dream nonetheless (297; 334). Esch and Joachim, then, suffer variants 
of the same malady. Both are untimely men, clinging to an antiquated, ideologically-
compromised vision of the landscape, failing to fully apprehend the present. Unable to 
find a way through their predicament, they are often prey to chaotically eschatological 
explanations. They are preferable to those who simply accept things as they are, but they 
are far from heroic. 
Although less mad, and far less given to unsavoury messianism, Sebald‘s 
characters are frequently subject to similar processes of hallucination and derealisation; 
experiencing people or places as spectral, and feeling that their own reality is in turn 
called into question. Sebald‘s specters, like Broch‘s, are symptoms of crises in history, 
and their appearance is stereotyped: they recur from character to character, and from 
book to book, and announce themselves as cultural givens. So the two envoys of the 
Jüdische Kultusgemeinde who come to arrange the deportation of Austerlitz‘s mother 
Agáta (250; 258) seem to echo the Kafkaesque goons who assail the narrator of Vertigo 
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(109; 123-24). The ‗flickering‘ faces of the former, and the curious jerking movements 
of the latter, belong to a series of recurring traits which suggest the archival nature of the 
imaginary, the imperfectly-managed interpolation of other media which have supplanted 
memory. The pair from Vertigo look ‗as if they were out of an early motion picture‘, and 
in a sense they are: they appear as emanations of the narrator‘s researches into the fateful 
year of 1913. The pair from Austerlitz, on the other hand, are representations even in 
their present as Vera narrates it, because their collaboration with the Nazis is so 
incomprehensible, so irrational, that they cannot be quite real. It is as if, in surrendering 
their selves to the forces of history, they pass out of the realm of human individuality 
altogether. 
Sebald‘s characters, one might say, are at the Esch stage in this, insofar as they 
apprehend the theatrical nature of such scenes yet find themselves unable to dispel them. 
So, when Austerlitz travels by train through Germany for the first time in his adult life, 
he sees the landscape of the Rhineland as ‗mythological‘, a ‗romantic stage set‘. He can 
only remember the scene ‗as it was described by earlier travellers‘, complete with as yet 
unregulated waters, and Bishop Hatto‘s hordes of mice (318-19; 326-27). The narrative 
of this journey is thus ‗landscapeless‘ in the sense that the present landscape is lost to a 
‗symbolic substitute‘. Austerlitz, indeed, speaks on another occasion of a sense of 
‗Bodenlosigkeit‘—literally groundlessness—experienced in places which threaten to 
open up the abyss of time (153-54; 161). Such loss of reality as presence, however, does 
not straightforwardly imply a lack of truth. On the train, Austerlitz temporarily loses the 
present, but he also knows with ‗absolute certainty‘ (mit absoluter Gewißheit) that this 
was the same journey he made as a child on the Kindertransport, and gains the 
realisation that certain scenes of his subsequent Welsh upbringing owed their sense of 
the uncanny to their association with these scenes (316-17; 324-25). In a landscape 
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necessarily interpenetrated by other times and other scenes, uncertain footing may be the 
sign one is on the right track. What Austerlitz recovers is not a true picture as such: 
rather, what he apprehends is a chain of substitutions. But the apparent negativity of this 
displaced truth is belied, or at least tempered, by the certainty with which it is felt. 
Broch may seem to go much further in the direction of crediting his characters 
with visionary insight; at any rate their visions are more ecstatic, hysterical, 
eschatological. Yet, at the same time, the outcome of the these visions may be rather 
more negative, and less certain. The state granted to Esch is referred to with emphasis, 
substantivally, as ‗his sleepwalking‘, invoking a quasi-mesmeric notion that the 
benighted automaton may be compensated with clairvoyance (292-96; 328-33). And as 
he finally approaches Bertrand‘s house on foot, he even seems to enjoy somnambule 
Sicherheit (297; 334), leading some critics to wonder if the whole journey is not in fact a 
dream (Cohn 80-81). It seems to me, however, that Broch is not so much intent on the 
ontological status of the experience as on the sort of knowledge it affords. What is 
ultimately revealed to Esch is little more than the bare fact that he is a sleepwalker (339-
40; 380). One can scarcely call such negative knowledge enlightenment, for it does not 
result in an awakening. Here, Broch follows the logic of his concept with remorseless 
fidelity: in a world in which sleepwalking is the normal condition of humanity, this is 
the form reflexivity must take, passive and involuted; a dim night-light of the soul 
counselling nothing but acceptance of a loss of certainty.  
Indeed, if this process is even to begin, something must happen to break the 
stride of habit: Esch‘s everyday, we are told, will have to be thrown into uncertainty (ins 
Unsichere) in a way that makes it questionable whether or not one walks on one‘s feet 
(277; 312). The crucial moment comes with a seemingly banal accident, as Esch grazes 
his shin while boarding the train. Everything around him, he dimly realises, is mere 
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human contrivance (Menschenwerk), and so too are his thoughts (293; 329). They are, in 
other words, reified, and only the encounter with the brute objectivity of things can 
reveal this. The stay-at-home, Broch tells us, will never make this discovery because he 
sends only his thoughts out into the world, and flatters himself with their apparent 
success in the accidentless echo chamber of thought. The traveller, on the other hand, 
has lost this premature certainty (voreilige Sicherheit), so that the links between words 
and things slide into uncertainty (ins Unsichere), and he himself is ‗unsicher‘ as he 
walks along the train corridor (293; 329-30). Though he knows the train rolls over the 
‗good firm earth‘, he is all at sea, and he only pretends to look out of the window at the 
passing landscape (293-94; 330).  
Having gone through this crisis, Esch has got almost as far as Broch will 
generally allow his characters to go. For they seem, at best, to chafe at the limits of 
something like Hegel‘s ‗unhappy consciousness‘ (das unglückliche Bewußtsein): locked 
in thought systems which are secured at the expense of denying contingent reality, their 
only way forward is through accident and insecurity. Although Sebald‘s characters share 
many of the symptoms, their conditions are presented as being much more individual 
and psychological, much less determined by a master ideology. Consequently their 
prognosis may be a little less gloomy. Before he sends out his steps, Austerlitz‘s 
rejection of thought is emphatic. In the midst of his breakdown, language seems to him 
‗a makeshift expedient‘, a tentacle man uses to ‗grope blindly‘ through the darkness. 
Worst of all, the very mark of ‗purposeful intelligence—the exposition of an idea by 
means of a certain stylistic facility—now seemed to me nothing but an entirely arbitrary 
or deluded enterprise‘ (174-75; 183-84). If narrative Sicherheit is thus ostensively 
renounced, walking takes up the relay as his ‗nocturnal wanderings lead him to 
Liverpool Street station and the forgotten place of his first arrival in London. We make 
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our most decisive steps, he reflects, through an indistinct inner movement (aus einer 
undeutlichen inneren Bewegung) of which we are barely conscious (189; 197). His 
purposeful accumulation of knowledge, on the other hand, had only ever ‗served as a 
substitute or compensatory memory‘ (198; 206).  
By abandoning the pseudo-tentacles of the reflecting intellect in favour of a more 
direct, physical groping, Austerlitz seems to echo Esch. Yet he is more fortunate than 
Broch‘s sleepwalkers, for the knowledge he gains along the way is positive, recuperable 
by the intellect, and often very certain indeed. When he looks out of his train window at 
Prague‘s Wilsonova Station, the realisation that he has been there before dawns on him 
‗in vollkommener, auch nicht den geringsten Zweifel zulassender Evidenz‘ (308; 316). 
One sympathises with the difficulty of Anthea Bell‘s task as translator, but her ‗perfect 
certainty‘, even though it already sounds rather sure, is a pale shadow of this ‗utter, and 
not-admitting-the-least-doubt evidence‘. Though critics are probably right to stress the 
ultimate incompletion of Austerlitz‘s quest, their elision of such moments of certainty is 
perhaps curious. What is their place in the narrative and economy of uncertainty? Is 
certainty in itself a problem or even an embarrassment? 
Broch seems to think so. When his characters experience anything like this 
degree of certainty, it is generally not a good thing. In the third volume, Huguenau‘s 
‗schlafwandlerische Sicherheit‘ as he makes his way through the chaotic aftermath of 
the Great War is the mark of an amoral opportunism which culminates in the casual 
murder of Esch (348; 390). And his drift into business-like respectability in peace-time 
is no less damning: in either case he does nothing more than obey the logic of the times 
(637; 703). At this point we may look back to the remarkably extended meditation on 
Joachim‘s father‘s gait with which the trilogy begins, and understand why the utter want 
of purpose behind his mechanically purposeful air is so horrifying (9-11; 11-13). Herr 
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von Pasenow embodies the same sort of ‗objectivity‘ (Sachlichkeit) as Huguenau.iii They 
are both mere formal men, passively and indifferently determined by the path of least 
resistance. They are not conscious of any unhappiness, but as their consciousness is 
entirely reified, they are perhaps not strictly conscious of anything at all. 
System and Agency 
While the moral reasons for rejecting Sicherheit are thus clear, the theoretical price of 
this rejection is high, and the consequences for practice are terrible, seemingly insoluble. 
For even if we eschew the form of purpose, and give ourselves up to wandering, this in 
itself does not, in Broch‘s terms, preclude the possibility of an occulted purpose. If, as 
the ‗Disintegration of Values‘ essays argue, reason is in its very substance penetrated by 
irrationality, deciding or thinking anything at all is potentially problematic (564; 623). 
We are hostages to impulses beyond the reach of introspection, and as the trilogy draws 
to a close, reflecting reason has not achieved much beyond a painful consciousness of 
this predicament. At this, it makes its final, forlorn retreat into the body. Ill and 
undernourished, Bertrand Müller‘s certitude of living in ‗a sort of second-grade reality‘ 
is the fruit, he says, not of cognition, but of a paradoxically lucid physical feeling (von 
einem luzideren Körpergefühl). Though, as Müller notes, we should mistrust 
enlightenment gained by fasting, what his body seems to grasp is nothing less than 
Platonic reality. And in this sleepwalking that leads into the light (Schlafwandeln, das 
ins Helle führte), he is quite certain that only the slightest step (einen geringen Schritt) 
will transform this physical knowledge into a rational one. The point, however, is not to 
take this step, but only to feel one could take it, so that Müller‘s final (non-) decision is 
to remain in a hovering condition (Schwebezustand), forever standing on the brink (574-
75; 635).  
It is, to say the least, a dubious position, one that explicitly refuses to reach a 
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synthesis, and which certainly seems to chime with the ‗pure defeatism‘ which Sebald 
attributes to Broch (‗Una montagna‘ 125). By demoting consciousness to a modality of 
sleepwalking, one might argue, Broch has undermined the chances of agency from the 
word go, so constructing a system whose job it is precisely to make defeat seem 
inevitable. It is in this light that we must read Sebald‘s distaste for Broch‘s love of 
system and intellectualising grandiosity; for his ‗ethico-didactic sense of responsibility, 
in which he imagines he is allowed to leave nothing unsaid‘, and self-imposed need to 
tackle ‗big problems with large-scale concepts‘ (‗Una montagna‘ 120). Yet we will only 
concur in Sebald‘s view if we are convinced that Broch‘s initial premises, and so the 
dilemmas to which they lead, are entirely factitious. The problem for Sebald is that, as 
my analysis so far suggests, his own fiction seems to share many of these premises. 
Does he, then, have no ‗ethico-didactic‘ responsibility towards the concepts and figures 
thus mobilised? If, as I am arguing, the implicit logic of sleepwalking in Austerlitz is 
remarkably similar to that made more explicit in Broch‘s novel, is the ostentatious 
rejection of large-scale social theorising, or trumpeting characters as ciphers for grand 
epochal shifts, sufficient to clear Sebald of implication in system? In short, does Sebald 
manage to avoid the problems that afflict Broch, or merely to evade them? Were we to 
suspect the latter, Sebald‘s ambiguity and open-endedness might start to seem less 
unproblematically generous. Indeed, what seems more open-ended and suggestive may 
just be more discreetly theorised, so leaving itself less open to interrogation. There are, 
in any case, a number of moments in Austerlitz where sleepwalking is more pointedly 
thematised. It will be necessary to examine these to see how they deal with the problems 
of agency which afflict Broch. 
 
Somnambulistic Spectacles 
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Sleepwalking is explicitly referred to three times in Austerlitz and in each case it is used 
to describe the condition of those who have had the ground whipped from under their 
feet by catastrophes of history. The three instances can, what is more, be read as 
cumulative reworkings of the same spectacle, raising questions of how we should view 
what is presented. The first mention occurs as Vera relates to Austerlitz the reaction of 
the people of Prague to German occupation. 
People turned away, and from that moment they walked more slowly, like 
somnambulists, as if they no longer knew where they were going. (242)  
Die Menschen haben sich abgewandt, sind langsamer, wie im Schlaf gegangen 
von dieser Stunde an, als wüβten sie nicht mehr, wohin. (250) 
One could quite easily take sleepwalking here as no more than a convenient and 
conventional metaphor for the dazed, hesitant air of people who have suffered a terrible 
shock. Yet this would be to underestimate the extent to which Sebald, like Broch, is 
concerned with the abyss that may open up between the step that tends, and the ground 
upon which it actually falls. Something cataclysmic has befallen the very fabric of 
Prague, effectively erasing the old habitual pathways. By helplessly insisting on the 
objectivity of this superseded reality, the people of Prague may indeed be said to walk in 
a dream. This reading is confirmed by the verb sich abwenden. Elsewhere in the novel 
this ‗turning away‘ indicates Austerlitz‘s reaction to signs of a reality he is not yet ready 
to swallow (278; 286 and 304; 312). And in the lectures on aerial bombing, it is 
explicitly theorised as a ‗quasi-natural reflex‘, a refusal through shame and defiance to 
accept the fact of destruction (Destruction 30-31; Luftkrieg 37-38). Prague has not been 
destroyed, but for its people it has undergone a change so radical it might as well have 
been. In their slowness and perplexity, the people register the fact that things are not 
right, but their awareness remains purely negative, locked in the physical act. Crucuially, 
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Vera‘s narration itself seems to share in this condition: it cannot seem to rise above 
seeing things in their most obdurate, alienated, barely-grasped form, that of the obstacle. 
So when she exclaims, we are now obliged to live in a false (or wrong) world (in einer 
falschen Welt), she is not casting a political judgement, but expressing shock at the sight 
of a car speeding towards her from the wrong direction. It is the change to driving on the 
right, she insists, that ‗particularly upset us‘ (242-43; 250-51). Such a response, able 
only to point in dismay at the brute fact, is shocking in its political incapacity. Even the 
plight of the Jews, as Vera goes on to narrate it, is viewed almost entirely in terms of 
restrictions of movement.  
If Vera initially seemed to claim the narratorial privileges of distance and clear-
sightedness in presenting the pathetic spectacle of ‗the people‘, she is thus ultimately 
disappointed: she remains trapped in the same impotent consciousness as her fellow 
citizens. It seems she is not happy with this, for shortly afterwards she reworks the 
drama of the helpless sleepwalker in a rather more artful, visionary form. The ostensible 
occasion is one of two old photographs she has found by chance in a volume of Balzac 
which, she knows not how, came into her hand (der ihr, sie wisse gar nicht mehr wie, in 
die Hand geraten war). She has no recollection of taking the book, and the first thing she 
remembers is seeing herself reading it (256; 264). The discovery is, in other words, an 
act of somnambule Sicherheit, suggesting that what she subsequently ‗sees‘ is an act of 
clairvoyance. 
The Swiss boy with the apple on his head appeared in my mind‘s eye, Vera 
continued; I sensed in me the moment of terror in which the narrow bridge gives 
way under the sleepwalker‘s foot, and imagined that, high in the rocks above, an 
avalanche was already breaking loose, about to sweep the poor folk who had lost 
their way (for what else would have brought them to these desolate 
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surroundings?) down into the depths next moment. (257-58; 265). 
The status of this vision is, as Carolin Duttlinger has shown, to say the least ambiguous. 
The putative uncanniness of the photograph‘s discovery rests largely on the assumption 
that it shows Austerlitz‘s parents. Yet this is almost immediately refuted as Vera 
realises, somewhat bathetically, that the two figures on a stage dwarfed by an Alpine 
backdrop are more likely to be an unknown stage magician (Zauberkünstler) and his 
assistant. Her attention, in any case, quickly shifts from the human figures to the 
backdrop itself, and from there to imagining for which production it might have been 
constructed; perhaps ‗Wilhelm Tell, or La Sonnambula, or Ibsen‘s last play‘. By now, 
the photograph has effectively been emptied out, ready to be replaced by a composite 
drama merging critical moments from the three pieces mentioned. The ‗vision‘ is thus 
patently factitious and mediated in any number of ways, and perhaps says as much about 
Vera‘s identity as a former student of Romance languages and literature as anything.  
Yet it is not denied all affective truth: Austerlitz, at any rate, thinks he too can 
see (258; 265-66). Indeed, it is precisely in this generalised form, and thanks to this 
elaborate theatrical framing, that Vera can feel pity for the plight of the sleepwalkers 
without falling into the picture. This is not an entirely reassuring reflection, for the 
vision is arguably guilty, in Sebald‘s terms, of ‗lyricising and mythologising‘ the plight 
of the people of Prague: if it works aesthetically, it is by turning away from the 
empirical detail of Vera‘s own experience of history into a literary substitute. Of course, 
Vera herself may also be read as reflecting pessimistically on her own aesthetic means. 
As her notional walker steps from the theatre of Schiller (and Goethe, and Kleist), where 
sleepwalking certainty and clairvoyance are the prerogative of national heroes 
steadfastly pursuing self-determination, into the disenchanted world of Ibsen‘s When 
We Dead Awaken, where the failure of vision and surefootedness leads the protagonists 
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into disaster, we may see an allegory of the demise of the transcendental aspect of 
Romantic topoi. Indeed, in stripping Amina of her somnambule Sicherheit (in Bellini‘s 
opera she makes it safely across the bridge), Vera may even be said to force the issue 
somewhat. But no matter how many such reflexive gestures we read, we must also admit 
that they are aesthetically productive. For they all point to loss—whether in the spectacle 
itself, or in the spectacle of Vera‘s spectatorship, or even in our own spectatorship—and 
any pathos accruing to that loss is our gain as spectators. What if all this painful 
consciousness of artifice ultimately resolves into an aesthetic of despondency, and one, 
what is more, that we have grown to desire?   
As I have been suggesting, a dominant tendency in Sebald criticism resolves 
such questions by effectively deciding that Sebald‘s ‗steadfast gaze‘ really is ‗bent on 
reality‘ here (Destruction 51; Luftkrieg 57), with the proviso that the reality in question 
is not destruction itself, but the character‘s inability to face it. This critical move thus 
depends upon motives ascribed to characters to mediate, and distance us from, the 
aesthetic effects of the spectacle presented. The question I am now raising, however, is: 
how often can a spectacle or motif recur before we are forced to abandon the appeal to 
the quasi-agency of characters, and see it as the property of the text itself? This question 
is surely starting to impinge as we come to the third and final staging of the scene, where 
Austerlitz takes up the relay from Vera. Frustrated in his attempts to find his mother‘s 
face in a propaganda film showing Theresienstadt as a model labour camp, he has a 
slowed-down print made, hoping this will allow him a clearer view. 
The men and women employed in the workshops now looked as if they were 
toiling in their sleep [im Schlaf], so long did it take them to draw a needle and 
thread through the air as they stitched, so heavily did their eyelids sink, so slowly 
did their lips move as they looked wearily up at the camera. They seemed to be 
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hovering rather than walking, as if their feet no longer quite touched the ground. 
The contours of their bodies blurred and, particularly in the scenes shot out of 
doors in broad daylight, had dissolved at the edges... (345-48; 353) 
Ostensibly this is a failure, in the sense that Austerlitz‘s technological intervention 
brings him no closer to finding his mother. In this way we are once more invited to 
confront the mediated, phantasmal nature of the search. Viewed from another angle, 
however, Austerlitz‘s slow motion succeeds brilliantly in correcting the image, 
effectively restoring to these poor people the appearance the novel deems proper to those 
dragooned into a false course of history. Transported for incomprehensible reasons into 
a false landscape, they really ought not to feel their feet touch the ground. The 
heightened artificiality of the scene, following this reading, provides a sort of objective 
correlative, an adequate or just image, for the unreality of the experience for those in it. 
Even the film‘s technical limitations—its blurring and flickering—which are presented 
as impediments to vision, become positive features of the spectacle, the natural 
complement of spectres throughout the novel. If we are being asked to question this 
spectacle, are we not also being tutored into desiring it? 
 
Aesthetic Agency 
 At some point, all the framing and relativising of point of view in the world will start to 
seem a pretext, showing by a sort of preterition what it affects to cancel. And the 
accompanying reflexive gestures may, in their very pessimism and insistence, lose their 
critical force and resolve into elegy. It becomes important here to consider how we may 
argue, without riding roughshod over the legitimate operation of character and point of 
view, that such and such an image is ultimately the responsibility of the text itself. When 
Austerlitz is in the depths of his breakdown, we may fairly presume he has no choice but 
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to see colours and forms ‗of diminished corporeality [...], images from a faded world‘ 
(von einer sozusagen verminderten Körperlichkeit [...], Bilder aus einer verblichenen 
Welt) (179-80; 187-88). But Alphonse, the Great Uncle of his friend Gerald Fitzpatrick, 
chooses to wear grey silk in place of lenses in his spectacles as he sketches his ‗almost 
colourless fragments‘, comically supplementing his conviction that the world is fading 
away before our eyes anyway (124-26; 132-34). For all that he cuts a faintly 
preposterous figure, Great Uncle Alphonse is positively life-affirming in comparison to 
Uncle Evelyn who is (according to Gerald) bent with miserliness, and has, like May in 
Beckett‘s Footfalls, reduced his whole being to walking up and down the same strip of 
carpet. He also takes a line that is typically Sebaldian, and potentially offers a rationale 
for Sebald‘s own grey-tinted spectacles. Like Alphonse, Sebald is insistently drawn to 
images such as the ‗phantom traces‘ left by moths lit up in the darkness; and like 
Alphonse, he seems to hold that this sort of ‗sudden incursion of unreality into the real 
world‘ kindles our ‗deepest feelings‘ (131-32; 139). Our deepest feelings here are, as 
they always are in Sebald‘s fictions, more or less melancholic. Uncle Alphonse is thus 
allowed to speak from the heart of the text, to transcend his status as an individual 
character, and tell us what we are supposed to feel; viz. melancholy. Uncle Alphonse 
can also suggest some reasons why melancholy alone is exempt from suspicion of ‗the 
construction of aesthetic or pseudo-aesthetic effects from the ruins of an annihilated 
world‘ with which literature, according to Sebald, renounces its legitimacy (Destruction 
53; Luftkrieg 59). Crucially melancholy is, as we have seen, rather indifferent to the sort 
of reflexive foregrounding of artifice for which Sebald is praised. Like those accidents 
of light that photographers call artefacts, Alphonse‘s phantom traces sketched in the 
retina produce their effect not in spite of, but precisely on account of a knowledge of 
mediation and artifice. One could say, then, that melancholy just is the natural affective 
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life of disenchantment. But this also points to the part of Romanticism that survives 
disenchantment. For as well as being thoroughly Romantic in its own right, melancholy 
can be understood in classic Freudian terms, as the inability to fully mourn; in this 
instance, to mourn the death of transcendent vision.  
If this seems a grand claim, it is worth noting that, in Die Beschreibung des 
Unglücks, Sebald goes much further in the opposite direction, claiming that melancholy 
is ‗a form of resistance‘ (12). So curious a notion is this, one cannot but pause and 
wonder. Melancholy is not generally thought of as an active state at all, far less as 
engagé. What could it mean to recommend a passive, unwilled affliction as an ethical or 
political choice? Surely when history comes knocking, melancholics are the last people 
to whom one would look for a plan: one thinks of Hamlet. What is more, resistance 
implies the moment: it is not something that can be done retrospectively or in a state of 
absence. A dreamily recollected house in the Slieve Bloom mountains, inhabited by a 
family of somnambulists who, lost to the current of time, go through the same motions 
endlessly, may give rise to most beautiful and acute reflections on the sadness of history, 
but it is scarcely at the heart of the action (Rings 208-22; Ringe 247-64). Likewise, the 
angel of history may be condemned to travel backwards, but when we speak of 
resistance we are usually expected to face forward. This is not to say that Sebald should 
offer an arm-raising call to action, but that his invocation of resistance strikes an odd 
note. For it comes dismayingly close to proposing something like the idea of ‗passive 
resistance‘ with which Broch and his ‗inner emigrant‘ contemporaries salved their 
consciences, and which was ‗indistinguishable from passive collaboration‘ (‗Una 
montagna‘ 121). Might we not begin to wonder if Sebald‘s own sleepwalkers may also 
be the vehicles of an aesthetic which offers a good conscience to political defeatism? 
My purpose is not, however, to use Broch as a stick with which to beat Sebald. 
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Both writers have, in their very different times, a profoundly ambivalent relationship 
with the inheritance of German Romanticism. Both see the dangers of mysticism and its 
atavistic survival into modernity; yet rather than simply sloughing off these aspects of 
Romanticism they find it necessary to tackle them head-on, and work them through. 
They are hardly alone in this. Both are clearly influenced by psychoanalysis, and one of 
Freud‘s defining moves, it need hardly be said, was to take seriously what might seem 
mystical or irrational ideas. The Romantic inheritance—from Hegel to Hoffmann, and 
not least its gloomy or disenchanted side in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche—is 
acknowledged as an important source of insight in his work. One is reminded also of 
Adorno‘s equivocal remarks on Walter Benjamin. Benjamin, says Adorno, was 
positively drawn to the ‗petrified, frozen or obsolete elements of civilization‘. Rather 
than avoid mythical thought, his ‗Medusan‘ (medusisch) gaze plunged headlong into it: 
by making everything mythical, he secularised myth. Benjamin‘s ‗magnetic attraction‘, 
Adorno seems to say, made him a novel sort of magician (Prisms 229-41; Prismen 234-
49).
 
Although the epigraph to the Broch essay might suggest he would balk at the 
term, perhaps we can see Sebald, a great admirer of Benjamin, as a similar sort of 
conjuror; one whose trick would consist of emptying Romantic topoi of transcendence 
whilst filling them up with secular marvels. Here somnambulism, with one foot in the 
everyday, and another in the world of miraculous feats and prophetic vision, is pivotal. 
For, as we have seen in the case of Vera‘s vision, even once it has been stripped of the 
supernatural, what remains may be a secular marvel. Something similar would apply 
even to mesmeric divination. The most emphatic articulation of theatrical divination in 
Austerlitz comes in the form of a goose in a circus. Joining the rest of the troupe in the 
finale, a strangely halting dance, it has the craned neck and lowered eyelids of a 
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clairvoyant, and seems to know the fate of its companions. The fact that it is a goose is, 
of course, a fairly clear signal that we are not to take this magic too seriously. Yet we are 
expected to believe that in the image (Bild) of the goose is captured or sublated 
(aufgehoben) something—the mysterious evocative power of music—which Austerlitz 
has never been able to understand intellectually (383-84; 389-91). In spite of the goose, 
the scene remains at some level an instance of the Romantic topos of seeing in the 
somnambulistic performance of a dancer or musician an intimation of something like 
destiny (see e.g. Heine 50). 
Spectacular set-pieces of this sort are not, however, my ultimate concern. It is 
perhaps inevitable that they act as lightning-rods for critical attention in that they act out, 
in capsule form, problems with which the novel as a whole is concerned. But while they 
may influence how we weave the fabric of the narrative, they cannot simply legislate. 
Indeed, given too much authority, they may serve to distract us from other forms of 
divination, those solicited by the patterns of recurring images, so often labelled 
‗uncanny‘, of which Sebald‘s texts are composed. However mediated or unsettling these 
may appear in any given instance, their recurrence invites us to divine occulted links, 
and draws us into recognitions which constitute the doleful pleasure of the text. Many of 
these images are symptomatically Romantic: protagonists are wanderers who encounter, 
in otherwise unpeopled landscapes, lone figures with strange walks who flicker and jerk 
spectrally, and who may also be little people, or sport oriental headgear. And when they 
are not on the move, they are gazing longingly out of windows, or leaning their heads 
melancholically against walls. But far less obviously uncanny motifs can perform the 
same function. Gloves, for instance, trace throughout Austerlitz a mournful current of 
destiny: Austerlitz and the narrator have one of their first long chats in the 
‗Handschuhmarkt‘ of Antwerp (16; 24); Vera‘s Aunt Otýlie ran a glove shop (225; 233); 
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Austerlitz imagines his mother in a haberdashery in Theresienstadt taking gloves from a 
drawer (343; 350); and, though this is not apparent in the English translation, it is a 
glove that the photograph of the infant Austerlitz as the Rose Queen‘s page boy extends 
in challenge to his older self (260; 268). This last-mentioned instance seems to provide 
the key to the motif, by tying it into the novel‘s exploration of the problems of memory 
and history. But it is also the most emphatically picturesque and folkloric, and if it can 
be made to raise questions concerning the knowability of the past, this is very far from 
diminishing the pathos of destiny.  
It has been argued that Austerlitz marks a new development in this respect. For 
John Zilcosky, what made the earlier fictions authentically uncanny was the characters‘ 
inability to become sufficiently lost: only in Austerlitz are we offered a more 
conventional postmodern model of lost-and-found. I would argue, however, that 
Austerlitz, rather than changing the game, differs only in that it shows its hand a little 
too much. In so doing, it may lead us to ask if the uncanny, or the inability to escape 
repetition, need be as unsettling as we have become accustomed to think. Zilcosky cites, 
for instance, the ‗astonishment‘ and ‗horror‘ with which the narrator of The Rings of 
Saturn finds himself constantly returning to the same stretch of heath en route to 
Michael Hamburger‘s house (Zilcosky 683). Yet this episode prefigures, and is 
subsequently countersigned by, Hamburger‘s account of his own sleepwalk round the 
ruins of post-war Berlin (Rings 178; Ringe 212). What is more, during his stay with 
Hamburger, the narrator notes as ‗incomprehensible‘ the coincidence of a shared 
acquaintance (187; 223), and even feels he is losing the ground from under his feet (188; 
224). For all that they evoke melancholy and confusion, these Sebaldian repetitions 
conspire here, as in Austerlitz, to suggest a sort of fellowship in exile and sleepwalking. 
Like Sebald and Hamburger themselves, such motifs must become, in their repetition 
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within and between texts, old friends, so that the reader too may find a way into their 
somnambulistic community, along a path made of steps only ostensibly uncertain, 
leading as they do all-too surely to a ritualised despondency. 
 
Pleasure, Ambivalence, and Polemic 
I may seem thus to take a rather solemn, moralistic view of the pleasure of reading, but 
this is not at all my intention. In the first instance, the problem of pleasure is not 
something I am introducing into the debate. Implicit in claims for Sebald‘s reflexivity is 
precisely the idea that pleasure must be managed or circumscribed, that an unreflecting 
delight would, in this context, be a danger; that the text must prove itself worthy of our 
pleasure by showing its awareness of the danger. But John Zilcosky, it seems to me, 
raises a question too often taken for granted when he warns that ‗we cannot uncritically 
grant ethical status to a literary device‘ (695). In other words, the plausible 
demonstration of a reflexive gesture is not in itself sufficient. Even so, having floated 
this caveat, Zilcosky seems to be under a powerful compulsion to conclude: ‗But Sebald 
is not so easily caught‘. Thus, even after he has seemingly damned the too-easy 
pleasures of Austerlitz as ‗Holocaust melodrama‘, Zilcosky perorates by tentatively 
wondering if this may not be an entirely bad thing, provided we can find in it an ‗ethical 
dimension‘ (697-98). The reasons for this drawing-back from condemnation are not in 
themselves particularly mysterious. For we all stand here under the terrible shadows of 
Auschwitz and Adorno, and are compelled to ask if lyricising or aestheticising disaster 
are at all acceptable. On pain of banning writing on the subject altogether, Sebald, and 
consequently his critics, must look for ways to dramatise the problems of their task. Yet, 
precisely because the stakes are so high, and the vigilance demanded so impossibly 
acute, the response will very readily polarise into condemnation on the one hand, and 
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apology on the other. To raise serious difficulties without seeming to compromise a 
work entirely becomes exceedingly difficult.  
 At this point, however, Adorno‘s essay on ‗Cultural Criticism and Society‘ 
reveals a further, less-often considered danger. For, immediately before declaring poetry 
after Auschwitz barbarism, Adorno remarks that ‗the most extreme consciousness of 
doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter‘. Reading in line with the relentlessly 
dialectical tenor of Adorno‘s argument, we may infer that this is not just a contingent 
hazard, but that there is an inherent logic tending to flip from one extreme to the other. 
And, again following the insistent lines of Adorno‘s argument, this will be so to the 
extent that a ‗consciousness of doom‘ is subject, like everything else, to 
commodification and reification. At a push we might even argue that the most extreme 
consciousness would be especially vulnerable: in its incessantly repeating anxiety it may 
take on the character of a fetish. Adorno‘s own passage from doom to fetish is of 
considerable interest here, for it resembles in some respects that of Sebald. In his very 
insistence on the dangers of the ‗bewitched reality‘ (Prisms 23; Prismen 12) of ‗a 
humanity which has been enchanted [...] into clientele‘ (26; 15), Adorno compulsively 
hallucinates the very mysticification against which he so vigorously strives. Few oeuvres 
are as full of ghosts, spells and witches as that of Adorno, and at times these may seem 
what is most real in it. Indeed, the spell is real insofar as it dominates the world, and the 
terms in which it does so may remind us of both Sebald and Broch: for ‗[w]hat differs 
from the existent will strike the existent as witchcraft, while thought figures such as 
proximity, home, security hold the faulty world under their spell.‘ (Negative Dialectics 
33; Negative Dialektik 41). 
Curiously enough, Negative Dialectics even has its own fairy-tale goose, Mimi, 
from Wilhelm Hauff‘s tale ‗The Dwarf Nose‘. Mimi, says Adorno, helps the boy who 
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has been transformed into a dwarf to an understanding of his deformity that no amount 
of introspection could have supplied. In Adorno‘s reading, the tale is a fable of 
subjectivity: the subject is enchanted (verzaubert) by the name of subjectivity, just as 
Dwarf Nose is enchanted by the herb ‗sneezejoy‘. Just as he must be directed by Mimi 
to the take the herb once more, so must we confront subjectivity homeopathically, so to 
speak, rather than by looking into our own subject as a given (182; 181). It is a charming 
fable, but the pharmakon—or, if you prefer, the hair of the dog that bit you—is always a 
risky quantity. Kill or cure, Adorno‘s rhetoric of enchantment inflates in direct 
proportion to the grinding intensity of his negative dialectic. Become compulsive, the 
language of disenchantment curiously rivals the sleep of reason in the production of 
monsters.  
If one felt inclined to indict Adorno for backsliding one doubtless could. But 
where a predicament reveals itself so intractable in writers so differently situated, we 
may begin to suspect that it is a serious one, and it can hardly be the occasion for 
polemic and straightforward taking of sides. Neither Broch, nor Sebald, nor Adorno can 
remake from the ground up their intellectual inheritance; and there is no other ground on 
which they can stand, free of entanglement. This, indeed, is what Adorno‘s ‗Cultural 
Criticism‘ essay tells us. Each, therefore, must negotiate it after his fashion, but none can 
ever hope to dispose of it entirely. The task of criticism in such a case is thus not either 
to denounce or to excuse: it is to take stock of the risks in which our pleasure as readers 
entangles us. And this entails an order of uncertainty far more unsettling than that which 
may result from a textual game set up by a conscientious author. Is there not, in any 
case, something a little alarming in the idea of an author who would be so far the master 
of his proclivities, and who would move with such perfect tact, as to be able to lead us 
unscathed through doubt and destruction? And if our fervent attention to spectacular 
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enactments of uncertainty only serves to screen more intractable problems, do we not 
risk sleepwalking through a simulacrum of critical consciousness? 
We are all compelled to take a leap in the dark here, for the idea of a correct bad 
conscience is incoherent, ultimately indistinguishable from a commodified good 
conscience. As Sebald says of Broch, what distinguished him from the pedlars of 
fascism was his ‗good faith, coupled with a bad conscience as to the inner qualities of 
his writing‘ (‗Una montagna‘ 129). Faint praise as this may seem, ought not something 
of the sort to apply, to a greater or lesser extent, to any writer who takes seriously the 
difficulties of confronting political disaster? The practical question is, what form does 
one‘s conscience take, and where does one put it? There may be a sense in which 
Sebald‘s criticism acts as a proxy conscience for his fiction, reassuring through its 
trenchant certainties that the suggestiveness and ambiguity of the fictions are in good 
faith. But if this is so, it seems the first casualty of polemic is ambivalence. For  any 
appearance of moral rigor achieved in this way will be at the expense of evading, 
through a rather brutal division of labour, the synthesis that caused Broch so many pains. 
Can such a cantonisation of the critical and the fictive, each in its proper place, 
ultimately work? One may suspect that the repressed part will, in either instance, have 
its revenge. In its anxiety to achieve moral clarity and distance, criticism may undo itself 
and end up acting out what it condemns. It is thus precisely through his sense of freedom 
from entanglement in any of Broch‘s dilemmas that Sebald ends up perversely evincing, 
in his criticism, the very pose of high-minded rationalism he claims to find so repellent 
in Broch‘s fiction, and even in terms avowedly borrowed from Broch. Likewise, the 
denunciation of a prophetic style may itself take on a dismayingly prophetic tenor. 
Sebald perorates by imagining Broch close to death in exile in the United States, and 
contemplating a return to Judaism. Perhaps, Sebald suggests, Broch had at long last 
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climbed Mount Nebo to look down, like Moses, on the Promised Land of Canaan he 
could never enter (‗Una montagna‘ 129-30). Given his view of Broch‘s mythologising 
tendencies, is Sebald really so sure he can keep his footing at such rhetorical heights? 
 
University of Reading 
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i
 Sebald‘s essay remains untranslated, and all translations offered here are my own. 
ii
 The trilogy advances in fifteen-year stages to 1918, the end of Wilhelm‘s reign, and of 
the Empire. 
iii
 The third volume‘s full title is ‗1918 . Huguenau oder die Sachlichkeit‘. By construing 
the three volumes as ‗The Romantic‘, ‗The Anarchist‘, and ‗The Realist‘, the Muirs‘ 
translation risks obscuring the skewed, ironised relationship each of the protagonists 
bears to his allotted concept. 
